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Questions:
Section 1: Online platforms, consumers, suppliers
Defining online platforms 
Q1. Do you agree with the Commission’s definition of online platforms? What are the key 
common features of online platforms and how they operate? What are the main types of 
online platform? Are there significant differences between them?
Many similar, but mildly different, definitions of online platforms exist and the 
Commission’s definition is as good as any.
The common feature is that they are multi-sided markets, while the significant differences 
arise from the data types that underpin their operation and the primary sources of income 
from the different sides of the market. Sales platforms (marketplaces, ‘sharing’ economy, 
app stores, payment systems) have a direct revenue stream from the sale of goods 
(percentage of sales price, cost of listing products charged to sellers); social media & 
information platforms (communication platforms, social networks, search engines, maps, 
news aggregators) rely more heavily on revenue from advertising and market intelligence 
delivered by the platform.
Q2. How and to what extent do online platforms shape and control the online environment 
and the experience of those using them? 
Service ‘personalization’ is frequently used to ‘optimize’ the customer interaction, this 
involves filtering/recommending the products/services the customer is presented with. 
Facebook newsfeed for example selects the stories that are presented based on a complex, 
hidden, algorithm that includes information about past ‘likes’ by the customers, but also 
many other parameters. Even though the ‘personalization’ of services may results in an 
improved customer experience, it raises a number of concerns. 1. In order to do the 
personalization the platforms collect a wide variety of information about the customer, 
including past behaviour on the platform, location tracking (Facebook location tracking was 
recently blamed as possible cause for large power drain in iPhones), scanning of content 
posted by the user (Google scans content of Gmail, Facebook traces everything a user does, 
including messages that were deleted prior to posting). 2. The algorithms act as editors, 
selecting which information is presented and how visible it is to the customers, for instance 
the ranking/positioning in a list of search results. This editorial power of the online 
experience of customers has potentially far reaching consequence. During the 2012 US 
presidential election Facebook ran an experiment which showed that people who had been 
notified when their friends mentioned that they’d just voted were significantly more likely 
to have also voted during the election. One concern we have is that the 
filtering/recommendation algorithms used by online platforms are becoming increasing 
complex and may not even be understood by the platform providers themselves, especially 
if adaptive systems are used. One consequence of this is that platform providers may not be 
able to guarantee that they are compliant with regulations. 
Effects on consumers, suppliers (including SMEs), competitors and society
Q3. What benefits have online platforms brought consumers and businesses that rely on 
platforms to sell their goods and services, as well as the wider economy?
The clear benefits include: access to a much wider, international market, as buyer or seller; 
“free stuff” based on the widespread freemium model; and cost reductions due to both 
benefits of scale and their use of “big data” to drive the business – that is the organisations 
have competitive advantage by being data led and analytic in their management. 
Q4. What problems, if any, do online platforms cause for you or others, and how can these 
be addressed? If you wish to describe a particular experience, please do so here.
One of the main problems with online platforms arises from the centralized architecture 
where data from/about the user is transferred to the platform provider, resulting in a loss of 
control over the data by the user and a strong power imbalance in favour of platform 
providers. Users are often confronted with an all-or-nothing choice in which they must 
accept complete surrender of control over their data, even if they wish to use only certain 
parts of the platform services. This can results in discontent and/or suspicion by the users, 
who might nevertheless feel compelled to use the service due to peer-pressure (fear of 
missing out) or lack of alternatives (for many online services there is only a single large 
player in the market; closed systems make it impossible to interact with users of the 
platform without buying in to the platform as well). The problem is often confounded by the 
use of an advertising based revenue model where consumer data becomes the ‘gold’ that is 
mined by the platform.
An alternative approach to online platforms, that would address the issue of loss of control 
over personal data by the users, would be a decentralized data ecosystem where users 
retain control over their data. Instead of uploading their data to a centralized system under 
the control of the platform provider, users could keep their data on a personal ‘databox’ 
and provide monitored/controlled temporary access to those parts of their data that are 
required for a service. By retaining control over the data, users could monitor who is 
requesting access to the data, withdraw access rights when the user no longer desires the 
service. Prototype systems of this type have been developed by various research groups, 
including Horizon.
Q5. In addition to concerns for consumers and businesses, do online platforms raise wider 
social and political concerns? 
The fact that online platforms are increasingly becoming the information gateway for 
people, especially younger generations who get much of their news from online platforms 
via mobile devices, raises social and political concerns similar to traditional news media. 
Concerns about media empires with too much dominance in newspapers or TV coverage, 
should equally apply to online platforms where it is now common for a single provider to 
dominate a service sector (Facebook for social networks, Google for search). As shown by 
Facebook’s own study (2012 US elections impact on likelihood to cast a vote [see Q2]), they 
have the power to influence voting behaviour.
Social concerns also arise from the fact that the majority of online platforms are developed 
in the US (Silicon Valley) and therefore operate under US (Silicon Valley) oriented social 
values which can differ significantly from EU/UK values, as for example with attitude 
towards the precautionary principle for consumer products. 
Platforms as part of the Digital Single Market Strategy
Q6. Is the European Commission right to be concerned about online platforms? Will other 
initiatives in the Digital Single Market Strategy have a positive or negative impact on online 
platforms?
Yes, the European Commission is right to be concerned about online platforms. They are 
dominated by a small number of virtual monopolies and due to their cross-border operating 
reach are best regulated at the EU level, rather than individual country level. 
“Internet of Things” and “Smart cities” have the potential to further expand the influence of 
online platforms. Services like Uber are positioning themselves to mine information from 
social media communications and mobile device location tracking to identify the time and 
places where there is likely to be high demand for drivers. The functioning of the online 
platform service, and the algorithms that drive them, is set to have direct implications for 
‘real world’ phenomena like city traffic. 
Section 2: Competition, data, collaborative economy 
Competition and dominance 
Q7. Is there evidence that some online platforms have excessive market power? Do they 
abuse this power? If so, how does this happen and how does it affect you or others?
When considering social media platforms it is important to consider that ‘market 
dominance’ is strongly linked to the number of peers who are using the platform. 
Anecdotally, many people who would like to quit Facebook and move to a different 
platform ultimately continue to use Facebook because that is where their peers are. 
Potential competitors (e.g. the open source social network platform Diaspora) who try to 
move into the social media market often struggle because of this. No users wants to move 
to a platform if there aren’t already many other users there to interact with. 
[Q8. No response.]
Collection and use of data
Q9. What role do data play in the business model of online platforms? How are data 
gathered, stored and used by online platforms and what control and access do consumers 
have to data concerning them?
For many online platforms the default business model has become the ‘freemium’ / free to 
use model that is supported by advertising revenue. While the obvious side of the 
advertising revenue are the ads that are shown on an online platform, a second source of 
income is often the sale of platform user behaviour statistics. Data are commonly gathered 
through multiple sources, including: storing of the information that is posted to the platform 
(e.g. product reviews), tracking of user behaviour on the site (tracking-cookies track 
behaviours like, where the users has clicked on a site and the amount of time between 
clicks), purchasing of data about behaviour/interest of demographic classes of users. The 
data is used to sell targeted ad space to advertisers and to feed into the 
filtering/recommender algorithms that ‘personalize’ the user experience. Users typically 
have very little control over any of this data collection. Privacy settings on sites like 
Facebook primarily stipulate how information is shared between users, not how the 
platform provider gathers and uses the data. Terms & Conditions of online platforms are 
usually formulated to give maximum freedom to the platform provider to use the data as 
they wish. For example T&Cs often include vague, broad-stroke, clauses such as ‘data may 
be used for research purposes’, where the research question is not specified to the user. 
Users usually have no options to control how their data is used, if they want to use the 
services, or even just part of the services, of the platform provider, they have to consent to 
handing over full control of their data to the platform. Various platforms do provide users 
with comprehensive access to the content that the user contributed to the platform, such as 
a download of the posts that were made to G+, but do not provide access to the tracking 
data that was collected about the user.
Q10. Is consumer and government understanding and oversight of the collection and use of 
data by online platforms sufficient? If not, why not? Will the proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation adequately address these concerns? Are further changes required and 
what should they be?
Consumer understanding of the collection and use of date is severely hindered by the overly 
long and complicated Terms & Conditions, Privacy statements and similar text that they are 
presented with at the time of signing up to an online platform. Faced with these long texts 
that are written to be understood and used in US court rather than by ordinary consumers, 
as well as having no recourse to accepting the T&Cs other than not being able to use any 
part of the platform services, consumer commonly default to a behaviour of ‘click-signing’ 
the agreements without even trying to read the content.
Information concerning the collection and use of data should be presented to the consumer 
in clear language, preferably supported by kite-marks, as proposed/concluded in the House 
of Commons Science and Technology Committee report on Responsible Use of Data (Fourth 
Report of Session 2014-15).
On the topic of automated decision making by algorithms, the UK Data Protection Act’s 
‘principle 6’ specifies that “the right of subject access allows an individual access to 
information about the reasoning behind any decisions taken by automated means. The Act 
complements this provision by including rights that relate to automated decision taking. 
Consequently:
 an individual can give written notice requiring you not to take any automated 
decisions using their personal data;
 even if they have not given notice, an individual should be informed when such a 
decision has been taken; and
 an individual can ask you to reconsider a decision taken by automated means.
These rights can be seen as safeguards against the risk that a potentially damaging decision 
is taken without human intervention.” Importantly, however, these rights arise only if “the 
decision has a significant effect on the individual concerned”. This caveat means that 
virtually all of the filtering/recommendations made by online platforms are exempt. 
An important factor to consider is the magnitude of exposure to algorithm decisions that 
citizens are confronted with. Even if no single decision by any of the algorithms is violating 
the protection against having significant decisions made about an individual by wholly 
automated means, the accumulated effect can be difficult to estimate.
With regards to the EU GDPR, it is not yet complete nor ratified, and there will be a 2 year 
implementation phase only after which we will truly know how it will operate. As such it 
would be premature to suggest it is not fit for purpose or indeed jump to further data 
protection legislation before the existing plans execute.
Q11. Should online platforms have to explain the inferences of their data-driven algorithms, 
and should they be made accountable for them? If so, how?
Data-driven algorithms are an increasingly important element in determining the customer 
experience when using online platforms. The algorithms filter and rank which information is 
presented to the user and where it is presented, which affects the likelihood that a 
customer will notice and interact with the data. The high volumes of data available online 
means these algorithms are vital for enabling users to find the relevant information, be it 
search results, news stories of product offers. Consumer decision, ranging from who to vote 
for, down to choices in music to listen to are all influenced by the information people are 
exposed to. This is the basis of advertising and propaganda. Lack of transparency about the 
way in which algorithms manage this information introduced the potential for abusive 
manipulation. This can take the form of censorship, such as suppressing negative comments 
about the platform provider, or anti-competitive business practices such as the alleged 
manipulation by Google of ranking their own products higher in search results. 
Accountability or algorithm inferences, or lack thereof, affects the development process 
behind the creation of the algorithms. In the current environment where the platforms are 
not accountable for algorithm behaviour, there is little incentive to focus on the 
interpretability of algorithmic processes. Due to the large number of parameters that are 
used by the algorithms, even the engineers who constructed the system are often not able 
to explain why the algorithms made specific decisions. This is even more so in the case of 
adaptive systems that learn from continuously evolving example data sets, as is the case 
with deep-learning and similar systems. We do know however, that all data-driven systems 
are susceptible to bias based on factors such as the choice of training data set. Since the 
dominant online platforms are US based, it is likely that training data sets will contain biases 
that reflect US culture. For example, it was shown that Google’s deep-learning based image 
classification system relied heavily on the presence of black and yellow colours to identify an 
image as containing a school bus, because the training dataset was based on US images, 
where school busses were always yellow and black. Another example comes from a study 
that compared Google Ads which were presented when using the US version of Google to 
search based on either typically White-American names or African-American names. In the 
case of African-American names, the Ad Words algorithm produces significantly more ads 
for criminal background checks. Since this kind of a search based on a person’s name is a 
common practice when evaluating job applicants, the Ad Words results have potential to 
subconsciously promote racial discrimination in employment practices. There is no reason 
to assume any deliberate discriminatory intentions by the developers of the Ad Words 
algorithm. The algorithm is probably data-driven, based on statistics of Google searchers 
correlated with the names. The resulting recommendations generated by the algorithm, 
however, are likely to influence user choices. In this case further increasing the probability 
of requesting a criminal background check when searching an African-American name. This 
in turn reinforces the correlation that caused the algorithm to make the discriminatory 
recommendation. By this way, small initial biases can become self-reinforcing and magnify 
themselves. As demonstrated by the racial-discriminatory behaviour of the Ad Words 
algorithm, even supposedly neutral algorithms that are based purely on observations of 
internet usage statistics are not value-neutral. Rather they tend to reinforce an existing 
status-quo which might not be in the interest of the values that the UK society is striving for. 
However, the topic of data driven algorithms and their interpretability is currently in the 
realm of research, so through Research Councils and initiatives such as the Alana Turing 
Institute, this should be made a priority for “big data” related research funding.
The collaborative economy
Q12. Can you describe the challenges that the collaborative economy brings? What possible 
solutions, regulatory or otherwise, do you propose?
One of the largest challenges from the collaborative economy is the power relationship 
between the platform provider and the people who perform the services that are being 
offered, such as the drivers for Uber. Contrary to the image that these platforms advertise, 
of people signing up to the service to ‘share’ their skills during their free-time, the 
collaborative economy platforms are likely to attract people who are in low or precarious 
employment and in need of additional income. It is therefore important that these workers 
are given the rights and protections of employees, and not treated like ‘holiday workers’. 
The current regulatory environment and possible interventions
[Q13.  No response]
Q14. Should online platforms be more transparent about how they work? If so, how? 
Yes, online platforms should be more transparent about how they work. They should 
provide clearer insight into the kind of data they collect about users, including behaviour 
tracking, as outlined in the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee report 
on Responsible Use of Data (Fourth Report of Session 2014-15).
The platforms also need to provide more clarity about the level to which the user 
experience is manipulated by filtering/recommender systems, preferably giving users more 
control over the level of filtering that is applied.
Q15. What regulatory changes, if any, do you suggest in relation to online platforms? Why 
are they required and how would they work in practice? What would be the risks and 
benefits of these changes? Would the changes apply equally to all online platforms, 
regardless of type or size?
As noted on data protection previously, the implications of the impending EU GDPR cannot 
be predicted and further regulation in this area would be counter productive to the effective 
implementation of GDPR. However, the need for interpretability of algorithms should be 
reinforced as a requirement of GDPR and work undertaken to make it possible.
As we are not market and competition specialists, we could only comment that until actual 
market harm has been demonstrated, it would be premature to engage in further 
competition regulation.
Q16. Are these issues best dealt with at EU or member state level?
Due to the cross-border operating nature of the large online platforms, and the desire for a 
digital single market, whenever possible, preference should be given to dealing with these 
issues at EU level.
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